Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 44) policy that drives reconstruction and stability (R&S) operations, and whether the USG has postured its legislative procedures and governmental agencies to support this policy. The current operational environment dictates how the USG will structure capability and expand capacity to successfully meet the strategic challenges. The United States' history is full of great examples of conducting R&S operations; however, the looming 21
st Century challenges will demand a "Whole-of Government" approach to R&S operations. By focusing the USG national level approach to these operations, a better legislative approach will emerge. A new NSPD that is supported by statutory reforms that do not restrict the civilian and military capacity is paramount. The Departments of State (DOS) and Defense are the most important agencies in implementing this national directive. It is incumbent that clear delineated lines and authorities are granted to both agencies to facilitate a coherent national policy. The U.S. Army and DOS will need to reform some of its structure, policy, doctrine and training to better support the nation in R&S operations.
REDEFINING THE US APPROACH TO RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILITY OPERATIONS
The United States Government lacks an encompassing Reconstruction and Stability (R&S) Policy that grants the requisite authorities, establishes structure and provides resources for success in a world marked by persistent conflict. 1 The current policy, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 44), has been heralded as the best attempt to create a national policy to rectify an inherent weakness in US national policy to plan and execute R&S Operations; however, it still possesses flawed fundamentals. It further exposed US inability to establish unity of effort when conducting these operations. U.S. Agency for International Development, future military commanders will not be able to rid themselves of the tasks of maintaining security and stability." 4 The problem is the U.S. Government does not have a policy that explicitly addresses the authorities, structure and resourcing process required to support this aspect of US national interest.
Clear authorities are essential to plan and execute R&S Operations. Because R&S operations are almost always multi-agency, Congress will have to establish or approve the authorizations and the process for securing resources. Structuring an agency or force that can plan, coordinate and execute any given R&S problem set should be part of a coherent policy. Thoughtful consideration and flexibility should also be incorporated as it is nearly impossible to foretell all possible eventualities. Global conflict trends point to a world where security is paramount and the inability of other agencies to assist in the initial phase of stability operations will become the norm as seen in Iraq. The global environment greatly impacts the US armed forces' structure. Specifically, an effective R&S policy must have legal authorities to assign missions and to direct actions to insure they are seamlessly planned and executed. Being the lead coordinator does make the DOS the lead agency, but that is insufficient. Without stronger language in the policy, it is a piece of paper that lacks the power to enforce or direct implementation and the authority to establish coordinated capacity to conduct operations. The policy must contain language directing continuous resourcing and programming in order to effectively conduct long term planning solutions. Furthermore, a lasting policy is needed that withstands changes in administrations and establishes the United States' R& S position in the name of national interest. NSPD-44 has some parallels to PDD-56 in the fact that they both lacked action and lasting implementation.
The Post Cold War era exposed seams in the United States Government's ability to conduct stability operations. First, the danger of world events demanded more flexible action. This is inherent with the executive branch, but is at odds with the 10 The key trend that will impact R&S operations and induce the US into conflict areas will be demographics. The areas that effect demographics are: population migration, location, age, education and resources. The United States Census Bureau predicts the world population to be 6.9 Billion by 2010. 11 Two critical aspects of this population growth are: 90% will be in developing countries and most governments will not be able to meet their population needs. 12 Another area that will impact US interest is the fact that 49% of world's population lives in urban areas and this will increase to more than 60% by 2030. 13 A combining factor of a youth bulge, 15 to 29 year olds, will dominate developing and poor countries thus adding to a young urbanized population. Eventually, the USG should form a National Committee for Reconstruction and
Stability. An example would be renaming a national committee for Reconstruction and Stability for National interest and Strategic planning (RSNS). This committee would be a permanent organization that includes representatives from all stakeholder agencies, legislative and executive branches. Streamlining the process where executive branch desires are linked to authorizations and agencies that must plan and implement operations will provide a national planning strategy that is holistic. These members must be able to pass legislative authorization for programs, funding and appropriation for government agencies and programs. Other relevant committee members must also have a seat in this committee so there is no perception problem that they have ceded power. A good example of this type of cooperation was the bipartisan Armed Control
Observers Group created in 1985 for Arms Reduction and Control Negotiations. This committee would hold regular consolations to plan, provide oversight and more when a crisis demanded attention or consolations. 21 The DOS is not as apt at planning because its newly developed capacity to do so has not improved enough to provide a credible alternative. 22 Also, DOS has other restrictions placed upon it by custom, and in some cases law, or policy. Some of these are the American Service-Member Act of 2002 (ASPA) that effectively cut off specific types of military assistance to countries that signed on to the International Criminal
Court and the Nethercutt Amendment that placed prohibitions on economic support to foreign countries. 23 Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice equated the impacts of these restrictions to shooting ourselves in the foot. 24 The number of sanctions on foreign governments makes it difficult for DOS to plan long term stability operations in foreign countries. 25 Furthermore, the structure and inherent culture of DOS, plus its relationship with Congress, does not lend itself to an efficient organization for dealing with Stability
Operations despite the clear need to do so in support of our national interest. The congressional committees that support DOS have approached issues on reconstruction and stability very tentatively. A majority of the current legislation is focused more on human rights, regional aid programs and the method of delivery of aid. 26 The larger defense budget has given defense committees more prominent power. The defense budgets are highly guarded from deficit cuts with its powerful constituency for defense issues compared to the foreign operations account that are easily cut. 27 Congressional committee members on foreign affairs do not have the coherent view on R&S operations and funding. Even the executive branches of the Office of Management and Budgeting (OMB) see the DOS budget as an easy target for budget cuts.
The inability of the USG to plan and execute stability operations and use soft power has caused concern with the current Secretary of Defense, he stated, "I remain concerned that we have yet to create any permanent capability or institution to rapidly create and deploy these kind of skills in the future, we need to develop a permanent The SRC is a 2,000 person strong organization with the same representation of the ARC. The key difference is the SRC trains for two to three weeks a year, is the second element to deploy, and deploys within 45 to 60 days of a crisis for up to 180
days.
The CRC is the third organization, consisting of 2,000 personnel. One big difference is these personnel are outside the federal government and are called to active duty to serve in the federal government much like the DOD's ready reserve when called to active duty. They are civilian experts that incur a four year service obligation that provide much needed skills from specific civilian sectors that would better enable the USG during R&S operations. After mobilization, they are trained and then within 30-60 days they are deployed up to a year.
Broad assumptions have been made about the culture changes of DOS and other government agencies' Officers will be required to facilitate NSPD 44s success.
Ambassador John E. Herbst believes that the DOS culture will take a decade to change. Foreign assistance authorizers of annual appropriations have ceded entirely to appropriators thus causing appropriators to impact programs. 42 A crucial piece is for DOD, DOS and the legislative branch to work closer in funding priority R&S programs dictated in multiple strategic documents which support national interests.
In 
Joint Doctrine
The joint definition of stability operations clearly lays out the interagency need and a very land centric need for the Army to be the core of Stability Operations. The
Army must undertake actions in coordination with other relevant USG agencies in order to secure support. The United States Government views Stability Operations as an integral element of the USG's capability to achieve the full breadth of national missions that support U.S. policy. To solidify these missions, some adjustments in Title X need to dictate specified reconstruction and stability service responsibilities. This would clearly define stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations (SSTRO) responsibilities by service.
Army Doctrine
The Army has published FM 3-07 Stability Operations that lays out a doctrine and conceptual foundation that DOD can choose to apply to planning and executing for those who have completed education and assignment requirements, the Army will do more than incorporate lessons in their education system but track and give credit to those who serve in interagency assignments. Officer level education and training will change cultural biases towards other agencies. A third challenge, however, is in developing training opportunities with other agencies. This will require the cooperative development of training plans and scenarios, and most important, a fenced funding stream for those non-DOD agencies. This will lead to exercises, training and concept developments that have an interagency perspective.
The Army must prepare to also lend its expertise in planning to other agencies.
A recent GAO report characterizes the new planning process for R&S operations by DOS "as cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it has produced." 52 Most courses offered by DOS are short one day introduction courses. 53 Having DOS planners attend the Army's Strategic Planners Course at Carlisle Barracks or similar academically challenging course that awards an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) is required to produce qualified non-DOD planners. This training would improve DOS planning and foster cooperative contingency planning between the two key departments. These DOS planners would become an integral part of operations planning at flag-level staffs. They would then become invaluable members to lead the culture change that Ambassador Herbst said DOS so desperately needs. The DOS has made great strides in planning documentation in the last two years by establishing a planning framework. DOS recognizes the requirement to have a whole government approach to planning. DOS accepts the purpose of R&S planning "is undertaken in support of achieving transformation in the specified country or region undergoing or projected to undergo violent conflict or civil strife." 54 Another key element to changing culture must be to improve information sharing among the agencies. This is critical when preventing and preparing for the next trouble spot in the world. Intelligence officers and regional specialist are critical in providing the leadership with critical assessments of fragile states. 55 Combatant Commander's should not accept an assessment that does not include interagency assessments from the start. Again, shared schooling and exchanges would greatly benefit both DOD and DOS. Supportive personnel management of Army officers and interagency personnel is
essential. An important aspect is the promotions and awards that are given to those who serve in these organizations. This lever proved to be critical in establishing requirements for joint qualification for becoming a general officer. Many leaders inside and outside DOD are calling for a Goldwater Nichols II to force another such change. 56 Despite its extensive historical involvement and even recent deployments, the The Road Ahead
The USG has executed Reconstruction and Stability Operations in the past.
What has significantly changed is the fact that the large tank-on-tank, state-versus-state battles are diminishing and in its place we face strategic challenges that will draw the USG into longer more prolonged problems that require considerable amounts of forces and resources to provide security in failed or failing states. A vital factor affecting success in future conflicts are that uniformed and civilian assets of the USG will be employed for Reconstruction and Stability Operations that produce a different kind of "victory." 67 Some recommendations for achieving the necessary synergy among those elements of government are: acknowledge the complexities of the world environment that impact the USG; establish a policy that directs concrete measurable participation from all agencies; align policies and directives with U.S. Strategy; then insure that those policies are backed by requisite programming and planning authorities.
The US has been forced to invest billions in the countries of Afghanistan and Iraq due to the security threats they pose to US national security. Any initial R&S Operations will be done by the U.S. Army until security is at a level where other agencies can deploy and engage effectively. Thus, the Army needs to have the capability to conduct initial R&S tasks. The Department of State needs to restructure leadership and planner training, and personnel recruiting. 68 All of these will require major shifts in culture for DOD and DOS.
Essential elements in a new policy must address the authorities to plan, lead and spend. In order for an organization to plan, it needs to take a long term approach to current and future problems. Authorization Act, DOD has transferred $100 million to DOS for projects for stability needs. 69 Although a step in the right direction, the authorization does not program financial capital for strategic responsiveness. DOD spends more than transferred last year in a day in Iraq.
Conclusion
The world has changed more than the United States Government has been willing to restructure its policy to align all agencies and branches of government. The US hesitancy to construct a clear policy that delineates responsibilities and grants authorities to an agency or even a combined NSC and congressional committee for Reconstruction and Stability Operations will continue to plague the effectiveness and potential of the USG. In order to attain U.S. political objectives, a comprehensive policy that forces DOD and DOS into fundamental changes that reflect the realities of future threats is needed immediately for successful Reconstruction and Stability Operations.
Secretary of Defense Gates recently stated "to truly achieve victory as Clausewitz defined it-to attain a political objective -the United States needs a military whose ability to kick down the door is unmatched by its ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward." 70 Because there is no other agency capable of 
